

# Prevention of Fatigue Failure

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**Shot Peening and Blast Cleaning  
Workshop**

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**PURDUE**  
UNIVERSITY



**“Well,  
back to  
the old  
drawing  
board!”**

**Drawing by Peter Arno; ©  
1940, 1968, The New Yorker  
Magazine, Inc.**



Drawing by Peter Arno. © 1940, 1968 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

# Lessons Learned from Failure



**“On the contrary, our research revealed much information. First, the unit is quite unpredictable.”**


# Objective

## Overview current fatigue design criteria for aircraft

- Background
- Overview failure modes
- Fatigue design criteria


# Principal Causes of Fatal Aircraft Accidents (1950 -2008)

- 1300 fatal commercial aircraft accidents world wide
- Excludes military, private, helicopter, and aircraft with less than 10 people aboard



Ref: <http://www.planecrashinfo.com/cause.htm>

# Failure Modes: Aircraft




**Aircraft**

- **QinetiQ study based on approximately 3000 case histories**
- **Ref. Findlay & Harrison, "Why Aircraft Fail," *Materials Today*, Nov. 2002**




# Failure Modes: Engineering Component



- QinetiQ study based on approximately 3000 case histories
- Ref. Findlay & Harrison, "Why Aircraft Fail," *Materials Today*, Nov. 2002

# Structural Failure Modes

- **Excessive Deformation**
  - Elastic
  - Plastic
- **Creep**
- **Buckling**
- **Corrosion**
- **Fracture**
- **Fatigue**





# Sun Tzu: The Art of War


*(circa 500 B.C.)*

## Know the Enemy

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt”




# Deformation




## Change in component size/shape

- Elastic (recoverable)
- Inelastic (permanent)






# Toughness vs Strength



- Recall high strength alloys more brittle than low strength
- Strength vs toughness trade-off has important consequences for material selection
- Must decide which failure mode(s) controls particular component

# Creep


- Time dependent deformations caused by sustained loading
- Aggravated by elevated temperature



# Buckling

## Failure of “slender” members

- compressive loads cause an “instability”
- Results in catastrophic collapse



# Corrosion

- Time dependent chemical reaction between material & environment
- Many forms: uniform, pitting, galvanic, stress corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement
- Causes general and/or local material loss
  - thickness loss > increased stress
  - local pits > stress concentrations
- Prevent by design, coatings, material selection
- Maintenance critical




Photo: ASTM  
Standardization  
News, April 96

# Corrosion Costs



- **\$13 B/yr – Aircraft Industry (North America)**
- **\$3 B/yr – Military aircraft (USA)**
- **\$2 B/yr – US Army**
- **~2% GDP – Australia**
- **0.8 – 1% GNP – Japan (1997 estimate)**
- **\$30 B – Bridges (US highway)**
- **\$4 B – US Army helicopters (1998 estimate)**
- **\$5 B – Power Generation (USA)**



# Fracture




- Catastrophic failure
- Very sensitive to pre-existent crack and tensile loading
- Final stage of fatigue



Crack Size  $a$


# Fatigue



- Failure due to cyclic loading
- Involves crack formation and propagation
- Very sensitive to initial “damage”






# Fatigue Failure Mechanism

- Crack formation, growth, and fracture
- Life depends on initial quality, load, . . .
- Much “scatter” in data





# Fatigue is problem for many types of structures



# Fatigue Failure of Toilet Seat






## Note:

- Fatigue cracks started at stress concentrations
- Characteristic beach marks






# Fatigue Failure of Toilet Lever




Note beach marks on fracture surface

# Environmentally Assisted Fatigue Failure




Fatigue →





# Fatigue Crack Formation



# Fatigue Crack Formation

- **Cracks often form at free surfaces – Sources of**
  - Slip (local plastic deformation)
  - “Nicks and dings” that act as stress concentrations
  - Exposure to corrosion
- **Can also form at other internal or external material inhomogeneities or other structural damage**

# Fatigue is a “Defect Assisted” Degradation Mechanism

## Extrinsic (manufacturing/service)


- Machining/manufacturing
- Corrosion
- Foreign Object Damage (FOD)
- Etc.

## Intrinsic (inherent to material)

- Constituent particles
- Pores
- Inclusions,
- Etc.

# Extrinsic Damage

## Fan Blade




### **FOD occurrence:**

- ⇒ stage
- ⇒ span location
- ⇒ depth
- ⇒ shape

## Propeller




### **Fracture Surface**



### **Fatigue origin**

# Intrinsic: Material inclusion



*Courtesy of Prof. H. F. Moore*


- **Fatigue failure of Railroad Rails**
- **Cracks started at internal material anomaly**

# Damage Tolerance

*The ability of a structure to resist prior damage for a specified period of time.*

## Initial damage

- material
- manufacturing
- service induced
- size based on inspection capability, experience, . . .



**Key attribute for “critical” components**


# Damage Tolerant Aircraft

**B-17F/Bf-109 midair collision on February 1, 1943 over Tunisia**



**B-17 flew 90 minutes and landed safely**

**Fig. 1.1 USAF Museum photographs**





# Rocket Motor Case Proof Test



(April 11, 1965)

Undetected 1.5 inch  
weld flaw  
failure at 50% design  
pressure

250  
grade  
maraging  
steel

22 ft dia  
x 75 ft  
long  
(Fig. 1.2)

↑  
0.75 in  
↓



# Silver Bridge Failure

(15 December 1967)


- Point Pleasant, W. VA
- Operated 19 May 1928 – 15 Dec 1967 (39 years)
- Sudden Collapse at 5:00 p.m.
  - 3 spans fell within 1 minute
  - 46 deaths/ 37 vehicles
- Stress Corrosion cracking failure
- Critical crack size ~ 0.12 in.




Figure 2.6 Point Pleasant Bridge after collapse (courtesy of Federal Highway Administration).




# Point Pleasant, West Virginia Bridge Failure



**Figure 2.2** Elevation of Point Pleasant Bridge showing location of joints C13, U7, and U13.



**Figure 2.7** One of the eyebar joints after collapse (courtesy of Federal Highway Administration).



**Figure 2.8** Fractured C13N eyebar (courtesy of Federal Highway Administration).

# Poor Damage Tolerance

## 1969 F-111 Accident



- Forging defect in wing attachment
- Caused failure after 100 flight hours
- Promoted advances in damage tolerant design





Fig. 1.4


# Thou Shalt Assume Cracks

## Military Specification MIL-A-83444 (USAF) (2 July 1974)

“This specification contains the damage tolerance design requirement applicable to airplane safety of flight structure. The objective is to protect the safety of flight structure from potentially deleterious defects effects of material, manufacturing and processing through proper material selection and control, control of stress levels, use of fracture resistant design concepts, manufacturing and process controls and the use of careful inspection procedures.”

*“... The analyses shall assume the presence of flaws placed in the most unfavorable location and orientation with respect to the applied stresses and material properties. . .”*

# Damage Tolerance Engineers



**Contentment through worry!**






# Damage Tolerant Design of B-1 Bomber


**First aircraft designed to damage tolerance**

- Requirements defined Feb. 1970
- Mil-Spec-83444, 1974
- Assumed initial crack ~ 0.05 inch






# Damage Tolerant Design



# Fatigue Design Criteria

- **Several ways to treat fatigue**
- **Criteria differ in their view of cracking and implementation of inspection**
  - Infinite life
  - Safe-life
  - Fail-safe
  - Slow crack growth
  - Retirement for cause


# Stress-life (S-N) Approach



- **Test specimens at different constant  $\Delta S$** 
  - $\Delta S = \Delta P/A$  or  $\Delta My/I$
  - Measure life N (usually total cycles to failure)
- **Life increases as load amplitude decreases**
- **Considerable scatter in data**
- **“Run-outs” suggest “infinite life” possible (mainly steels)**

# Endurance Limit (Fatigue Strength)

- **Maximum amplitude without fatigue failure**
  - $S_f \equiv S_e \equiv \Delta S/2$  for “infinite” life
  - “Infinite”  $> 10^6$  or  $10^7$  cycles
  - For steels  $S_e \cong S_{ult}/2$
- **Not all materials have endurance limit**
  - Define quasi limit =  $\Delta S/2$  at  $\cong 10^7$  cycles
- **Highly dependent on specimen condition, prior load history, residual stresses, etc.**



# Fatigue Design Criteria


## Infinite Life

- Prevent fatigue damage from ever developing
- Based on endurance limit, threshold  $K$  concepts
  - ==> very low design stresses
- Used for simple components/loading (e.g. valve springs)
- Not achievable in many cases
  - weight critical structure
  - complex load histories

**Susceptible to quality of component**


# S-N Scatter

- More variability for HCF (high cycle fatigue) than LCF (low cycle fatigue)
- Due to early crack formation at high loads, random at lower loads




# Design Criteria: Safe-Life

- Goal: remain crack free for finite life
- Assumes crack free initial structure
- Establish “mean life”
- Safety factors account for “scatter”



# Safe-Life Design

- Safe-life based on mean nucleation life/safety factor
- Assumes pristine structure
- Not damage tolerant
- Inspection required for new structure
- Would retire when safe-life expended
- For life extension use safety-by-inspection (SBI)







# F-111 Lessons Learned

- **Safe-life design inadequate**
  - (6000 hrs with scatter factor of 4)
  - Full scale fatigue test of 16,000 hrs
- **Safe-life design did not protect against manufacturing or service induced defects**
  - Not damage tolerant
  - Allowed use of low ductility materials
  - Inspection procedures inadequate
- **Led to new additional damage tolerance requirements in 1974**



# Safe-Life Limitation





- **Safe-life defeated by pre-existent damage**
  - F-111 “safe-life” 4000 hrs (failure at 104 hrs)
  - Not allowed by FAA (commercial transport), USAF
- **Not damage tolerant**

# Fail-Safe (Damage Tolerant)

## Contain single component failure

- Alternate load paths
- Redundant structure, crack stoppers

## Requires detection of 1st failure




# Slow Crack Growth (Damage Tolerant)

Assumes pre-existent crack

Crack growth life  $>$  desired service life  $\times$  S.F.

Design for fatigue crack growth resistance


Emphasis on inspection




# Safety by Inspection (Retirement for Cause)

## Maintain integrity by repeated inspection


- Consider in original design plan
- Apply as life extension for older structure




# Damage Tolerance is a “3-Legged” Stool




**Residual Strength**



**Crack Growth**



**Inspection**



Back to the  
Drawing  
Board, Hell.  
You're Fired!!

“No Sweat”  
Schuffert

